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Architectural Constraints on the Bootstrapping 
of a Personal Health Record
Joan Rodon & Alexander Chekanov
ESADE, Universitat Ramón Llull, Spain
joan.rodon@esade.edu, alexander.chekanov@esade.edu
Abstract. During the last decade we have seen a proliferation of electronic personal health 
record systems (PHRs) aiming to change the way people manage and receive healthcare. 
However, many of these initiatives have failed to take-off. We inquire into such unsatisfac-
tory outcomes by drawing upon the perspective proposed in the information infrastructure 
(II) literature. This literature views the value of PHRs as dependent on the number of actors 
using them. This poses a challenge for designers (referred to as ‘bootstrapping’): how to 
persuade users to adopt a PHR when the user base is still small. To address the bootstrap-
ping challenge, II literature suggests starting with a simple solution that creates immediate 
user value and enables users to enrol gradually. This paper seeks to explore how PHR archi-
tecture can hinder PHR bootstrapping through a longitudinal case study on the implemen-
tation of an integrated PHR. Our case analysis identifies four architectural constraints: poor 
data quality; coordination across heterogeneity; privacy and control; and re-configurability. 
This paper concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for the literature on 
personal and electronic health records and on the design of information infrastructures. 
 
Keywords: personal health record, architecture, feedback loops, bootstrapping, electronic 
health record, information infrastructure.
1 Introduction
There is mounting interest around the world on how electronic personal health record systems 
(PHRs) can improve the effectiveness and efficiency of healthcare delivery, and enhance a pa-
tient-centred care (Epstein et al. 2010). According to the American Journal of Medical Quality 
a PHR is: “a person-centered system designed to track and support health activities across one’s 
entire life experience; not limited to a single organization or provider.” However, many of these 
Accepting editor: Pernille Bjørn and Gunnar Ellingsen
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PHRs have failed to take-off despite the high stakes and interest in PHRs by health providers, 
national health services, and citizens (Archer et al. 2011; Nazi 2013; Wang et al. 2012). For 
instance, Google justified the discontinuance of its Google Health service on January 2012 by 
stating: “There has been adoption among certain groups of users like tech-savvy patients and 
their caregivers, and more recently fitness and wellness enthusiasts. But we haven’t found a way 
to translate that limited usage into widespread adoption in the daily health routines of millions 
of people.” (Brown and Weihl 2011). Similarly, the British National Health Service closed its 
HealthSpace service in March 2013 arguing that “the service was not as popular as we would 
have liked” (Connecting for Health 2012).
In an independent evaluation of HealthSpace, Greenhalgh et al. (2010) identify four main 
possible explanations for the limited success of HealthSpace: (1) flawed concept—HealthSpace 
was conceived as a data container rather than a component in a socio-technical network; (2) 
flawed product design—HealthSpace did not align well with patients’ self-management practic-
es, information needs, and preferred styles of communication; (3) flawed implementation and 
embedding – policy makers assumed that intended users would need no persuasion, training, 
support, or incentives to use HealthSpace; and (4) flawed timing—people were not ready for 
this type of PHR. In a similar vein, Nazi (2013) notes: “despite high consumer interest in PHRs 
and growing availability, a paradox exists in that adoption remains relatively low overall”. Nazi 
(2013) argues that the consumer (patient) perspective on PHR is insufficient to understand this 
paradox. Accordingly, Nazi (2013) conducts an in-depth case study of My HealtheVet, a PHR 
developed by the US Department of Veterans Affairs, from the perspective of care professionals. 
The authors identify several key factors explaining the outcomes of the implementation, adop-
tion, and use of My HealtheVet: namely, perceived relevance; perceived value; education and 
training; integrated with existing technology; alignment with workflow; incentives; access to 
information; and communication.
An alternative perspective to the study of PHR outcomes is proposed in the information in-
frastructure (II) literature. This literature defines an II as a shared, evolving, open, heterogeneous 
large-scale socio-technical system compromising an installed base of IT capabilities and their 
users, operations, and design communities (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010; Tilson et al. 2010). The 
II literature develops an alternative approach to the design of large-scale complex system such 
as PHRs. This literature suggests viewing II design as the bootstrapping of the socio-technical 
installed base (Hanseth and Aanestad 2003). In particular, bootstrapping involves starting with 
a simple, cheap, and flexible solution that addresses specific user needs and enables users to enrol 
gradually. Hence, the bootstrapping of an II leads to the generation of self-reinforcing dynamics 
that feed on the installed base and enable the II to grow. For example, as the installed base of 
users (e.g., doctors and patients) using a PHR grows, more value will be created for existing 
users (feeding on the installed base) and more users will find adoption worthwhile (growing the 
installed base). Accordingly, some II studies propose a set of design principles and rules for II 
bootstrapping (Aanestad and Jensen 2011; Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010). At the core of these 
design principles is the idea that certain aspects of II architecture can spur the generation of pos-
itive feedback loops involved in II bootstrapping. Drawing upon insights from this literature, the 
goal of this paper is to explore the constraints that PHR architecture can pose on bootstrapping.
We approach this research goal by conducting a longitudinal case study of the genesis, de-
sign, implementation, and evolution of a PHR (which we have termed RegPHR) that was im-
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plemented in a Spanish regional public healthcare system. RegPHR is an integrated PHR (Tang 
et al. 2006) that interconnects health data from multiple providers. In 2013, four years after 
it had gone live, RegPHR still had a marginal user base and there was only limited evidence of 
positive feedback loops. The question that guided our empirical study was: which aspects of 
the RegPHR architecture constrained the generation of positive feedback loops and ultimately 
inhibited the bootstrapping of RegPHR?
In addressing this question, this paper contributes to the literature on personal and elec-
tronic health record systems in several ways. It explains the low uptake of PHRs by showing the 
potential constraining role of PHR architecture on the generation of positive feedback loops. It 
identifies a set of architectural constraints that concur and extend the list of factors inhibiting 
PHR adoption that has identified prior literature (Greenhalgh et al. 2010; Lafkin and Horan 
2011; Nazi 2013; Noblin 2012). Moreover, since our case narrative tracks the changes of the 
architecture, our results account for the viewpoints of diverse actors. Our results also contribute 
to those studies that have analysed the relations between electronic health records and personal 
health records (Archer et al. 2011; Wang et al. 2012). We show how certain architectural fea-
tures conditioned the behaviour of doctors and ultimately negatively impacted on the value of 
health records for doctors and patients. Finally, we draw some lessons from our analysis of the 
case results against the design principles for II bootstrapping (Aanestad and Jensen 2011; Han-
seth and Lyytinen 2010).
The remainder of the paper is as follows. We begin by providing definitions of the central 
concepts of the paper. We then present the method, including the research approach and setting, 
data collection, and analysis. We then present the narrative for the case study. This section is 
followed by an analysis and discussion of the case results. The paper concludes with a reflection 
on the contribution of our findings.
2 Literature background 
EU policymakers have defined the need for radical improvements in the way people manage 
and receive healthcare (EU 2012). The realization of such a vision requires a transition from 
provider-centred healthcare towards patient-centred care (Vikkelso 2010). A lever for that tran-
sition is the deployment of comprehensive, integrated PHRs (Steele et al. 2012; Tang et al. 
2006) that give citizens access to their own health information stored in the electronic health 
record of health providers, or in the nationally-held summary care records. As Greenhalgh et al. 
(2010) comment: “personal electronic health records, managed by patients and interfacing with 
clinician held records, are seen as having a key role in the new care model, by facilitating storage 
and exchange of information, promoting engagement with self-management, and supporting 
continuity of care” (p.1). That is, PHRs are expected to empower patients and extend their role 
in the healthcare system (Pelzang 2010). Accordingly, PHRs as a subject of study is increasingly 
gaining the attention of researchers (Archer et al. 2011).
In line with some studies in the PHR literature (Greenhalgh et al. 2010; Lafky and Horan 
2011), our paper is concerned with the relation between aspects of PHR design (e.g., architec-
ture, functional capabilities, security) and the outcomes (e.g., adoption, use, outcomes, benefits) 
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of PHRs. However, unlike prior PHR literature, we explore such relation by drawing upon the 
information infrastructure (II) perspective (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010). We conceive inte-
grated PHRs as healthcare IIs. We broadly define integrated PHRs as shared, heterogeneousand 
open socio-technical systems that interconnect multiple electronic health and medical records, 
practices, actors, visions, interests, and so on. Integrated PHRs are complex because a given indi-
vidual may have visited multiple health providers during the course of a lifetime thus health data 
is distributed throughout many different systems and usually under different formats. PHRs are 
open as they must support a number of care management tasks that have not previously been 
performed by most people; and so the services and communities that can be added to PHRs may 
evolve in unexpected ways.
A core characteristic of IIs, and in turn PHRs, is that they are not designed from scratch but 
from the socio-technical installed base. In that sense, Hanseth and Aanestad (2003) conceive the 
design of IIs as bootstrapping. They use the concept of bootstrapping to refer to the “design pro-
cess taking as its starting point the challenge of enrolling the first users and then drawing upon 
the existing base of users and technology as a resource to extend the network [II]” (p.386). The 
concept of bootstrapping assumes that the design of IIs is path dependent and involves self-rein-
forcing dynamics that feed the installed base of the II—that is, bootstrapping involves positive 
feedback loops (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010). For instance, as doctors publish health data and 
informational services that patients regard as valuable in the PHR, more patients are likely to 
adopt it, and this in turn will likely stimulate doctors to use the PHR to interact with patients—
thus giving rise to a positive feedback loop process that will help the PHR to bootstrap.
Taking into account the relation between positive feedback loops and II bootstrapping, Han-
seth and Lyytinen (2010) propose three design principles that specifically address the bootstrap 
problem: 1) design initially for usefulness; 2) draw upon existing installed base; and 3) expand 
the installed base by persuasive tactics. These three design principles help designers “to create a 
self-reinforcing installed base by drawing upon existing ones, and avoid being trapped by the 
force of the installed base” (p. 15). Aanestad and Jensen (2011) extend this theory by suggesting 
the principle of ‘modularize the II’ for the bootstrap problem because this approach facilitates 
the mobilization of stakeholders. In particular, they argue that “modular implementation strate-
gies can bypass, or at least significantly reduce the challenges to stakeholder mobilization…, and 
can allow a decoupling of implementation activities so that actors can adopt partial solutions 
relatively independently” (p.173).
Despite the fact that II architecture stands at the centre of these design principles, existing 
studies that have drawn upon this four design principles in the analysis of their empirical results 
(Aanestad and Jensen 2011; Eriksson and Goldkuhl 2013; Jensen 2013) have not brought the II 
architecture to the foreground of their analysis. By architecture we mean the basic inner struc-
ture of the II – i.e., its technical components such databases, software applications, hardware, 
communications, and so on, how they interact to provide the overall functionality of the II, and 
the decision rights over them. In the context of PHR, the architecture broadly refers to how 
the technical components of the PHR address the storage, and access of health data and the 
management of the health practices (Steele et al. 2012; Tang et al. 2006). For instance, Steele 
et al. (2012) identifies five PHR architectures (portable storage-based PHR, smartcard-based 
PHR, mobile device-based PHR, remote server-based PHR, and hybrid PHR) based on two 
infrastructural drivers (the connectivity coverage, which impacts the physical location of data, 
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and ubiquitous technology, which deals with issues such as whether its storage device is fixed or 
portable, and the hardware requirements).
Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013) identify three positive feedback-loop processes of IIs which 
are partially dependent on the type of II architecture (either tightly or loosely coupled) and 
governance (decentralized vs. centralized control): innovation; adoption; and scale. With the 
innovation positive feedback loop “new products and services are created as infrastructure mal-
leability spawns recombination of resources.” (p. 918). Adoption is a positive feedback loop 
“by which more users adopt the infrastructure as more resources are invested to increase the 
usefulness of the infrastructure.” (p. 918). Scale is a positive feedback loop “by which an infra-
structure expands its reach as it attracts new partners by creating incentives for collaboration” (p. 
918). These three positive feedback loops can be combined to form configurations. In a review 
of 41 cases of II evolution, Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013) identify two configurations that 
correlate with the success of IIs: adoption, innovation and scaling; and adoption and scaling. 
The authors also find that while cases in the first configuration were characterized by loosely 
coupled architecture, cases in the second configuration were characterized by tightly and loosely 
coupled architectures.
In a study of ten healthcare IIs over the last 20 years, Hanseth and Bygstad (2014) identi-
fy two main architectural approaches: 1) the application centric/institutional interface (INA) 
architecture; and 2) communication system centric/service provider (SPA) architecture. An II 
based on INA architecture is built by extending the applications containing the actual informa-
tion (application centric) through communication modules for handling information exchange. 
Moreover, the INA architecture mirrors the organizational structure created by the information 
flows between the organizations involved. In that sense, an INA architecture is characteristic 
of the EDI paradigm in which “there is a tight coupling between each application and the 
[communication] module handling the information exchange for this particular application 
and a looser coupling between the various modules handling the information for the various 
applications” (p. 18). In contrast, with SPA architecture there is “a loose coupling between 
the applications and the communication system and a tighter coupling between the various 
communication modules” (p. 18). Applications with SPA architecture are integrated according 
to “an asymmetric pattern where the II is established to enable some organizations to deliver 
their services to others in a more efficient way. And the communication system is more tightly 
integrated to the systems of the service providers than those of the service consumers.” (p. 18). 
The authors found that while the IIs following SPA architecture were all successful, the IIs under 
INA architecture were more problematic. The authors show that IIs based on INA architec-
ture were characterized by complex technical solutions, complex project organization, escalating 
complexity, and a freezing of user practices (thus discouraging innovation).
In line with these studies, we conceive the generation of positive feedback loops that lead 
PHRs to bootstrap as contingent upon the architecture of the PHR. However, while these stud-
ies have mainly focused on the enabling role of architecture, we explore its constraining role. In 
particular, we study how architecture can pose constraints on the generation of feedback loops; 
and ultimately inhibit the growth of the installed user base.
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3 Research approach and setting
The research approach was a single longitudinal exploratory case study (Yin 2009). We adopted 
this approach given that there is no established theory for studying the relationship between 
PHR architecture and the generation of positive feedback loops that drive PHR bootstrapping. 
We conducted a longitudinal case study of the design and implementation of a PHR (that we 
have termed RegPHR) from 2009 to 2013. RegPHR was launched in 2009 by the health and 
social security department of a Spanish region. Four years after the launch, the user base was 
still not relevant (RegPHR had not already bootstrapped). In this sense, this is a unique and 
revelatory case (Yin 2009) for studying our research problem.
3.1 Research site
There are several levels in the public healthcare system of this region (primary care as the gateway 
to the healthcare system; specialized care; hospital care; socio-sanitary care; and mental health) 
involving four main actors: the department of health and social security; the regional health 
service; health providers; and citizens.
The department of health and social security (DHSS) is in charge of establishing health 
policies and maintaining levels of quality in delivery by creating a health plan, determining a 
healthcare budget, and accrediting providers. The regional health service (RHS) performs the 
insurance function, and is responsible for planning, purchasing, and assessing health services 
according to the health needs of the population. The RHS establishes service policies in line with 
the health policies defined by the DHSS. The health providers are those organizations that the 
RHS contracts to provide care services. Those health providers form a network of institutions 
with public, private, or mixed ownership. When the development of RegPHR started there were 
61 health providers managing 365 primary care centres and 69 hospitals.
3.2 Data collection
Qualitative data was collected over a two-year period (2011-2013). We collected data from 
several sources (semi-structured face-to-face interviews, statistics about adoption and use of 
RegPHR, workshop attendance, videos from workshops, and conferences presenting RegPHR, 
working documents, press articles, and professional articles) aiming at data triangulation (Yin 
2009). Most of these documents were publicly available. Moreover, the first author registered for 
RegPHR and used it from 2011 to 2013.
We conducted 26 interviews in two periods (see Table 1). Each interview lasted between 
60 and 90 minutes. Interviewees were identified mainly by snowball sampling (Miles and Hu-
berman 1994); that is, identifying subjects for inclusion in the sample by referral from other 
subjects. In the first period, we conducted 17 interviews. In those interviews we asked our in-
formants about their opinion of RegPHR and its evolution, the events they thought were most 
critical, and their role in those events. When the informants had knowledge about the design 
issues of RegPHR we asked them to relate those events with the design of RegPHR. Each in-
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terview was transcribed verbatim and analysed immediately after it was conducted so that data 
collection and analysis took place iteratively.
We came back to the field two years later (from March to June 2013) to gather more data 
about the evolution of RegPHR. At that time, the adoption rate of RegPHR was still unsat-
isfactory for its sponsor. We conducted nine additional interviews. The informants included 
five people who were at the core of the implementation of RegPHR and the shared electronic 
health record (SEHR1) for the regional health service. In those interviews we inquired about 
the evolution of the adoption rates of RegPHR and SEHR, the reasons for such unsatisfactory 
outcomes, the decisions and actions taken to spur the adoption of RegPHR and SEHR, and the 
motivations for those decisions and actions.
Interviewees
Period 1 
(March - June 
2011)
Period 2 
(March - June 
2013)
Doctors 7
Nurses 2
Third-party providers of health applications 2 4
Project managers of RegPHR 2 1
Coordinator of health IT at the DHSS and sponsor 
of RegPHR 1 1
Former coordinator of health IT at the DHSS and 
sponsor of RegPHR 1
IT security manager at the DHSS 1
Consultant of RegPHR project 1
CIO of a health provider 1 1
Responsible of the standards and interoperability 
office at the DHSS 1
Table 1. Summary of interviews for each period of data collection
3.3 Data analysis
Data analysis proceeded in three steps. Firstly, with all the data gathered we constructed an ini-
tial timeline of events for RegPHR, and created a first thick descriptive narrative of the case. We 
shared that narrative with three of the informants who were at the core of the team managing the 
RegPHR project (the two project managers, and the coordinator of health IT at the DHSS who 
had sponsored RegPHR) to check for validity (Yin 2009). The three informants mostly agreed 
with our interpretation about the evolution of RegPHR, but suggested minor changes that were 
incorporated within the narrative.
Secondly, we analysed the lack of bootstrapping depicted in the narrative through the an-
alytical lens of the feedback loops. To identify feedback loops we started by identifying the list 
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of interventions from the managers and designers of RegPHR and SEHR (e.g., the extension 
of RegPHR with a new service, the start of the roll-out phase, development of an API, develop-
ment of iPhone access for RegPHR, the extension of RegPHR with new users, the enrolment of 
a new health provider, the approval of a norm, the redefinition of a contract between a health 
provider and the regional health service, and the upgrade of a system). We analysed the moti-
vations and rationale behind these types of interventions to see which positive feedback loops 
they were supposed to spur. This led us to identify five positive feedback loops that managers 
and designers of RegPHR and SEHR expected (see Table 2). We also analysed the actors that 
were supposed to be involved and affected by the positive feedback loops. It can be observed that 
there were positive feedback loops involving the same type of actors (doctors or patients in the 
first and third feedback loops respectively) and others involving different types of actors (second, 
fourth, and fifth feedback loops).
Feedback loop (expected by managers of RegPHR and SEHR ) Actors
1. The more health providers (doctors) publish patient health data in 
SEHR (the regional shared electronic health record), the more doctors 
will be willing to access SEHR in their daily practices
Health providers / 
doctors  
2. The more the health providers (doctors) publish patient health data 
in SEHR, the more patients will find it valuable to use RegPHR; and 
in turn, the more patients that use RegPHR, the more doctors will see 
the value in publishing data in SEHR 
Health providers / 
doctors, patients
3. The more patients use the services of RegPHR that enable them to 
interact with other patients or generate content, the more attractive 
RegPHR will become for existing users (patients) and new patients
Patients 
4. The more patients use RegPHR, the more easily RegPHR 
management will be able to raise more resources to innovate new 
services for patients, and in turn, those new services will attract more 
users
Patients, RegPHR 
developers
5. The more open is RegPHR, the more third-party developers will be 
willing to publish their applications in RegPHR. The more healthcare 
applications that are available in RegPHR, the more patients will find 
it valuable to use RegPHR. The more patients that use RegPHR, the 
more third-party developers will be interested in developing healthcare 
applications for RegPHR. 
Patients, third-
party application 
developers 
Table 2. (Expected) feedback loops and actors involved
In the third step, we analysed the relationship over time between those unrealized five feedback 
loops and the architecture of RegPHR and SEHR. We identified four themes that explain how 
the architecture constrained the activation of these positive feedback loops. We discussed with 
two of the core informants the expected positive feedback loops and the four architectural con-
straints. In that way, we established the validity of our interpretation (Yin 2009). Once we had 
a clear picture of the causal processes relating the architecture to the feedback loops, we wrote a 
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narrative of the historical implementation of RegPHR that integrates the feedback loops and ar-
chitecture. The following section presents the narrative covering a five-year period (2008-2013). 
The narrative is organized into three phases: genesis; pilot and rollout; and opening.
4 Case narrative
4.1 Phase 1: Genesis of RegPHR
RegPHR is a web-based personal health record through which the health and social security 
department (DHSS) gives citizens secure and confidential access to their health data (generated 
in the public healthcare system). The health data that appears in RegPHR comes from SEHR, 
a shared electronic health record (SEHR) for the regional public healthcare system that was 
launched in 2008. SEHR interconnected all the electronic health record systems of the health-
care institutions providing services in the region.
The main goal of SEHR is the improvement of healthcare delivery services by means of 
sharing health information among doctors from different health providers. SEHR was neither 
conceived as the sum of the EHRs of the health providers, nor as a way to replace the EHRs of 
providers, but as a system to organize access to health data stored in the electronic health records 
of providers and in some DHSS databases. SEHR consisted of a central database working as an 
index or a repository of documents that gives doctors and general practitioners access (through 
a web browser) to the information in the EHRs of the diverse providers (see Figure 1). The 
information displayed in the browser is the following: socio-demographic data regarding the 
citizen; documents or reports (radiology, laboratory, therapeutic procedures, hospital release, 
and emergency room); diagnostics; prescription and immunization; and so on. Likewise, SEHR 
provided a set of tools for direct messaging between health professionals to facilitate their co-
operation. In June 2008, 15 hospitals, 292 primary care centres, and 22 centres of special care 
were connected to SEHR – i.e., they were ready to publish and access information from SEHR. 
By September 2009, SEHR contained 12 million health reports corresponding to 6.8 million 
citizens and 5,689 doctors had accessed the system. In June 2013, 93% of hospitals and 87% of 
primary care centres were connected to SEHR.
Another relevant principle for SEHR was that the citizen is the owner of his data, and has 
direct access to the data. According to this principle, SEHR served as a basis for the building of 
RegPHR. A main vision behind RegPHR is to give people responsibility for their own health, 
enabling them to take part in the management of the preventive actions and care, and improve 
the quality of care and coordination between health areas and professionals. RegPHR has no 
central database. It acts as a viewer of SEHR. All the information presented in RegPHR comes 
from SEHR. Information for citizens is presented in a web browser (that has same feel-and-look 
as the browser that doctors use to access SEHR).
The registration and authentication processes for RegPHR were designed as follows. To ac-
cess RegPHR citizens have to enter their personal identification code2 and use a digital certif-
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icate. There are two types of valid digital certificates: those issued by the regional certification 
agency3; and the certificate embedded in the national identity number. To obtain the first type 
of digital certificate citizens have to first fill an online form, next they have to physically visit a 
registration agency where their identity is checked and they are given a password. Citizens later 
use that password to download the digital certificate from the website of the regional certifica-
tion agency. During authentication, RegPHR checks in the database of insured citizens that 
the personal identification code corresponds with the identity number contained in the digital 
certificate, and that the citizen has the right to access data.
sEHR
EHR 1
Department of Health & 
Social Security 
EHR 2
EHR n
Health providers
Index
Repository
Doctors Citizens
browser
documents read through browser
regPHR
+
Figure 1. Architecture showing the relation between SEHR and RegPHR
4.2 Phase 2: Pilot and rollout of RegPHR
After a satisfactory pilot of RegPHR in 2009 with a group of ninety users, the managers of 
RegPHR decided to release the system in July 2010 in the same village (having about 20,000 
inhabitants) where the pilot was run. The first release of RegPHR included two main types of 
services: health data from SEHR (e.g., diagnostics, vaccines, and reports such as ambulatory 
care, hospital emergencies, and hospital admission) and access to administrative services that the 
DHSS already offered through other portals.
The rollout involved the cooperation and engagement of several local actors: the only health 
provider operating in that village; the city council that was in charge of communicating Reg-
PHR to the public; and other local organizations (one of which issues digital certificates). Man-
agers of RegPHR considered that the rollout strategy did not require many resources from the 
DHSS, and it ensured the involvement and commitment of the actors in the territory who were 
close to citizens. Moreover, the sponsor of RegPHR qualified such a rollout strategy as “low pro-
file”: “we started with this very restricted concept of a personal health folder in the sense that it 
was a collection of documents that were already in the shared electronic health record [SEHR]”. 
The sponsor considered that it was important to adopt a strategy that minimized frictions and 
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conflicts since RegPHR entailed profound changes in the role and relationships between doctors 
and patients, and between doctors themselves.
Following this rollout strategy, RegPHR was extended to other two villages (next to the first 
village) and where the same health provider was operating. However, the usage of RegPHR was 
still marginal. For instance, in March 2011 around 47,000 citizens had access to RegPHR, but 
only 190 citizens had accessed the system with a total number of 721 accesses since July 2010 
(nearly nine months after the rollout had started). The managers of RegPHR then broadened 
the rollout strategy. Firstly, they extended RegPHR to other health districts where other health 
providers operated, and to other groups who were independent of any given territory (e.g., 
blood donors). Secondly, they built an iOS app for iPhone to access RegPHR, and extended 
RegPHR with new information services from other systems of the DHSS (e.g., the medication 
plan that was in the electronic prescription system) (see Figure 2). By mid-2012 nearly 90,000 
citizens could access RegPHR – but barely 500 citizens had logged on and used RegPHR. By 
the end of 2012, the DHSS announced the deployment of RegPHR to everyone in the region 
(about 7 million people).
EHR 1
Department of Health & 
Social Security
EHR 2
EHR n
Health providers
Index
Repository
Doctors Citizens
Electronic 
Prescription
browser & iphone
documents through browser
regPHR
sEHR
+
Figure 2. Extension of the RegPHR architecture
4.3 Phase 3: Opening RegPHR
At the end of 2011 the RegPHR managers decided to open the system to third-party applica-
tions that were not owned or controlled by the DHSS. The idea was that citizens could person-
alize RegPHR with the health applications they were already using. This opening strategy en-
tailed transforming RegPHR into a platform for third-party applications. To achieve this, the 
managers of RegPHR set up an interoperability framework that defined the conditions for 
third-party applications to interoperate with RegPHR. Companies that wanted patients to ac-
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cess their applications through RegPHR would have to fulfil certain conditions and obtain rec-
ognition/approval from the DHSS. The interoperability framework consisted of four profiles 
(see Figure 3): identification (in order to guarantee a single sign-on from the citizen for the 
RegPHR and the third-party application); communication (so that third-party applications can 
access relevant patient information stored in RegPHR/SEHR); publication (the third-party 
publishes a set of services that citizens will see in RegPHR; patients can access those services 
directly by means of an app embedded in RegPHR or an URL); and portability (a set of condi-
tions to ensure that personal health data stored by the third-party application can be moved, if 
the citizen desires, to other third-party applications). Each of these profiles defined a set of 
messages that RegPHR and the third-party application must exchange. With the deployment of 
the interoperability framework, the DHSS would not develop new applications but would part-
ner with those third-party application providers who offer their services through RegPHR. The 
DHSS would control the content and the application of the interoperability framework.
Figure 3. Extension of the architecture to ensure the interoperability with third-party applica-
tions
The DHSS targeted firms providing applications for monitoring diabetes in 2012. The manag-
ers of RegPHR took advantage of the fact that the major health provider was tendering for the 
supply of test strips for the following years4. The DHSS asked the health provider to include 
compliance with the interoperability framework as a bid condition. From that moment, the 
interoperability framework became an obligatory passage point (Callon 1986) for providers of 
devices for the treatment of diabetes who wanted to access the public healthcare market. The 
DHSS targeted firms providing applications for the management of chronic obstructive pul-
monary disease in 2013. Three companies had obtained recognition from the DHSS by May 
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2013. Although these three providers complied with the interoperability framework, patients 
could still directly access the application for monitoring diabetes and did not have to go through 
RegPHR.
5 Analysis
5.1 Generation of feedback loops
This section depicts the feedback loops (Figure 4) that were supposed to be generated in the 
three phases of the case narrative. As shown in the first phase of the case ‘genesis of RegPHR’, 
RegPHR was initially conceived as a two-sided network built on top of SEHR: (1) health pro-
viders would publish the data into SEHR; and (2) patients would access some of that data (e.g., 
diagnostics, vaccines, and reports such as ambulatory care, hospital emergencies, and hospital 
admission) through RegPHR (RegPHR would filter and bundle that data to offer information 
services for patients). Feedback loops were supposed to be generated on the side of health pro-
viders (first loop of Figure 4) and across patients and health providers (second loop of Figure 
4). For instance, the more health providers (doctors) published information in SEHR, the more 
doctors would be motivated to use SEHR (first loop). For that purpose, SEHR management: 1) 
created a simple browser for doctors; 2) persuaded health providers to publish data to SEHR and 
doctors to access SEHR; and 3) developed APIs so that health providers could easily integrate 
the data from SEHR into their systems. The more health records published in SEHR, the more 
likely that patients would perceive value in using RegPHR; and the more patients using Reg-
PHR, the more doctors and health providers would see the value of publishing data in SEHR 
(second loop).
In the second phase ‘pilot and rollout of RegPHR’, the sponsors of RegPHR aimed to 
strengthen the generation of the second type of feedback loops (Figure 4). RegPHR manage-
ment adopted several measures to spur the third feedback loop (Figure 4); that is, the more 
patients participating in those online communities, the more value for the existing patients, and 
the more other patients would be willing to adopt those services. Health providers, city councils, 
and other local institutions were involved to reach citizens. An iPhone app to access RegPHR 
was created, access to RegPHR was opened to blood donors, the medication plan and other 
administrative services were incorporated, and associations of patients were enrolled and asked 
for feedback regarding new services. Moreover, the more patients that used RegPHR, the more 
able RegPHR management would be to raise more resources and innovate with new services for 
patients (fourth loop of Figure 4).
In the third phase ‘opening RegPHR’, given that the adoption rate of RegPHR was still 
irrelevant by the end of 2011, RegPHR was extended into a three-sided network: health provid-
ers who publish health data; third-party application providers who publish their services; and 
patients who access health data and use the services. This was achieved by setting up an inter-
operability framework that transformed RegPHR into an open and extensible platform. This 
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was supposed to be a key to driving RegPHR uptake, and hence, to drive a new type of positive 
feedback loop: new applications offered by third parties through RegPHR would attract existing 
and new patients to use RegPHR, and that in turn, would stimulate more third parties to join 
(fifth loop of Figure 4). This would also stimulate the third and fourth feedback loops. Likewise, 
during this phase, the interoperability framework was included as part of the tender for the 
supply of test strips to spur the second feedback loop. By May 2013 a total of 4,664 citizens 
had accessed RegPHR since its inception and reports and diagnostics were the most searched 
information services. By that time, four years after RegPHR was launched in 2009, there was 
only limited evidence of the first positive feedback loop and managers of SEHR regarded this as 
insufficient; and there was very limited evidence for the second, third, fourth and fifth feedback 
loops (Figure 4).
More health 
providers 
publishing health 
data in SEHR
More patients 
(citizens) using 
RegPHR
More resources for 
RegPHR to deploy 
new services
More third party 
applications 
offered through 
RegPHR
+
+
+
+
+ +
+
(1)
(2)
(4)
(5)
(3)
+
Figure 4. (Expected) positive feedback loops associated with RegPHR
5.2 Architectural themes
This section presents four themes showing how certain aspects of the architecture of SEHR and 
RegPHR (e.g., location of the data, modularity, and degree of interface openness) constrained 
the generation of the five positive feedback loops (see Figure 4). Obviously, besides the architec-
tural constraints there are non-architectural factors – e.g., project structure, available resources, 
governance, social practices, and legislation. Our analysis also takes into account the interactions 
of those non-architectural constraints with the architectural features. In Table 3 we relate the 
four architectural constraints with the affected feedback loops.
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Theme 1: Poor data quality
RegPHR was designed to act as a viewer of SEHR (which was the only source of information 
for RegPHR). The flow of information went from SEHR to RegPHR, but not the other way 
around (see Figure 1). This was a constraint for the type of services that RegPHR could initially 
offer. Those services (e.g., diagnostics, vaccines, and reports such as ambulatory care, hospital 
admission, and release) relied on data stored in SEHR. The DHSS did not implement services 
such as doctor-patient messaging, online communities of patients, or enabled patients to upload 
additional health data since RegPHR did not have a database for that purpose.
The quality of data in SEHR (e.g., in terms of accuracy, completeness, and timeliness) de-
termined the value of the RegPHR information services. Managers of the DHSS acknowledged 
that even though the number of health providers connected to SEHR was satisfactory, the be-
haviour of those health providers in terms of uploading or publishing information was unsatis-
factory. Not every health record was immediately published and so the quality of health data on 
SEHR was not good enough. As doctors and citizens perceived poor quality, they gave up using 
SEHR and RegPHR respectively, thus generating a negative feedback loop – the poor quality of 
the data published at SEHR meant that doctors and citizens gave up using SEHR and RegPHR. 
In short, the dependence of RegPHR on SEHR resulted in a ‘garbage in, garbage out’ effect in 
which, the quality of the health data on SEHR determined the usefulness of RegPHR.
From the point of view of the DHSS, the low quality of the data on SEHR was due to the 
failure of health providers to upload data, not because they did not have such data. Health 
providers had the health data in their EHRs, but they did not properly publish it on SEHR. 
SEHR worked either as a repository of health data (health providers uploaded the health data of 
patients); or as an index (in which health providers published a link to the health data). In any 
case, the architecture forced health providers to upload health data or publish links (push from 
health provider to SEHR), which meant that the quality of SEHR, and in turn of RegPHR, 
depended on doctors and health providers. In reality most of the health providers used SEHR as 
a repository for uploadhealth records, but did not publish links to those health records (with the 
exception of three providers). Some health providers who uploaded health records to SEHR did 
not like doing so because they claimed that created redundancy and a sense of loss of control. 
For instance, a CIO of a health provider running a major hospital and several primary health 
centres noted: “I want to keep the data on our systems. They [the DHSS] should come to search 
for the data in our systems.”
An option to address the data quality problem resulting from the misbehaviour of health 
providers was to implement a pull architecture in which SEHR would request data from health 
provider systems – and not the other way around. However, one of the arguments of the de-
signers of SEHR against the pull architecture was that it required 24/7 availability by health 
providers. That could not be guaranteed due the differences of technological readiness of health 
providers and the amount of health providers. So the pull architecture was discarded. The op-
tion to address the data quality problem, which the DHSS and RHS finally chose in 2012, was 
to include clauses in the contracts with health providers5 obliging them to upload data under 
certain conditions of quality, detail, and time.
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Theme 2: Coordination across heterogeneity
In the regional public healthcare system there is a great heterogeneity of health providers in 
terms of ownership, the type of services they deliver, and the territory where they deliver those 
services. It is normal that a patient visits a general practitioner in a primary care centre of one 
health provider, then the general practitioner refers the patient to a specialist of another health 
provider, and the patient then returns to the general practitioner for monitoring. Health provid-
ers need to coordinate their operations in order to provide integrated services. To address those 
coordination needs, health providers have long implemented mechanisms and practices to share 
health data. Obviously, those mechanisms and practices are local and support the coordination 
agreements that health providers have in place. For instance, a given primary care centre of a 
health provider has a given hospital of another health provider as a reference for specialized care, 
and accordingly, both centres set up a mechanism for sharing data which is only valid between 
them. These coordination mechanisms and practices mirror the territoriality of the provision of 
health services.
However, SEHR was designed as a general standard solution that would solve coordination 
needs among health providers for the whole territory. SEHR was supposed to be respectful of 
the EHRs of health providers as it acted as an index that kept the healthcare data distributed 
in the EHRs of health providers. However, SEHR neglected the mechanisms and practices that 
health providers had implemented on top of their EHR in order to solve those coordination 
needs. SEHR threatened those inter-health provider coordination mechanisms. For instance, 
we identified three types of scenarios that illustrate the tensions between SEHR and the mech-
anisms that were already in place.
In the first scenario, we found that health providers coordinated the provision of care services 
with other providers (for instance, because one delivers primary care services and the other offers 
specialized care in the same health sector) by defining mechanisms and practices to exchange 
and share health data (e.g., giving direct access to each other’s EHR). In this scenario, SEHR 
involved abandoning the cost-effective mechanisms to which health professionals had become 
accustomed. In the second scenario, we found cases in which diverse health providers had gone 
beyond the sharing of health data by giving direct access to each other’s EHRs, and have jointly 
created integrated EHRs to coordinate the provision of services in a given health sector. In this 
scenario, the health providers usually argued that SEHR added nothing to the integrated EHR 
they had in place. In the last scenario, the largest health provider, which operates in most health 
districts providing primary care and specialized care services, had already implemented an in-
tegrated EHR. This large health provider saw little value in using SEHR because its own EHR 
already fulfilled the coordination needs among their centres and between the different levels of 
care.
Moreover, two of the health providers that were interviewed noted that while the design 
of SEHR was oriented towards the document, their EHR and coordination mechanisms were 
usually oriented towards the clinical protocol and associated workflows. For the purpose of 
coordinating professionals at different healthcare levels or at the same level, an EHR oriented 
towards the protocol is supposed to be more effective that one oriented towards documents. As 
a response to this, in the regional health plan for the period 2011-2015, the DHSS defined as 
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a key project the extension of SEHR to include the clinical course of patients and the manage-
ment of the clinical protocols for the eight chronic pathologies prioritized by the DHSS.
In short, territoriality of the provision of health services in the region was already supported 
by various heterogeneous mechanisms and practices that health providers had already imple-
mented. Although SEHR might, from a technical perspective, be more effective and efficient in 
some cases because all the data would be centralized, it did not mirror the territoriality in the 
provision of integrated healthcare services. This discouraged health providers from uploading 
data to SEHR as they did not see much value in doing so – thus hindered the generation of 
the first positive feedback loop in Figure 4. This in turn, undermined the usefulness and value 
of RegPHR for patients as they did not always find all their health data on RegPHR—and this 
hampered the second feedback loop in Figure 4.
Theme 3: Privacy and control
All the informants of this research argued that the processes of registration and authentication 
were a major factor in the low uptake of RegPHR. They considered that these processes were 
cumbersome, particularly, taking into account that some health providers already offered online 
services for patients with much simpler authentication procedures. For instance, some health 
providers had long offered their patients a web-based system for booking appointments where 
patients identified themselves simply with the number on their individual medical card. How-
ever, the RegPHR registration and authentication processes were implemented following the 
recommendations of the regional data protection authority in 2009. Thus the regulatory frame-
work constrained the design of RegPHR.
In 2012 RegPHR managers started to consider an alternative authentication mode for Reg-
PHR, and they asked (again) the regional data protection authority about the need for a digital 
certificate—and this time they were told that a username and password was sufficient. As the 
former coordinator of health IT at the DHSS noted: “the last thing I did before I left [at the 
end of 2012] was to ask the regional data protection authority whether a digital certificate was 
still needed. Big surprise! It was no longer needed”. This would facilitate the registration and 
authentication processes and make RegPHR more attractive for citizens. However, this simpler 
process would generate additional tensions. Firstly, given the confidential nature of health data 
not all the sponsors of RegPHR were in agreement. Even some of the early citizen adopters of 
RegPHR, who were legitimized actors, opposed a lower level of security. The DHSS was consid-
ering using both two processes and letting citizens choose the desired level of security. Secondly, 
this simple authentication process would mean that the RHS (as the only insurer in the public 
healthcare system) rather than the regional certification agency would ensure the confidentiality 
of transactions by generating, storing, and maintaining usernames and passwords. This meant 
that the RHS would have to play an additional role, but that also meant more costs, which 
given the economic crisis and health budget cuts in Spain, increased the difficulty of changing 
the authentication process.
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Theme 4: Re-configurability
A core objective of SEHR was to improve coordination among health professionals. A core 
objective of RegPHR was to help patients take more responsibility and control over their health 
(i.e., the self-management of health and disease). While the architecture of SEHR was designed 
to support the coordination of health providers (although with some shortcomings as shown in 
the first and second themes), the architecture of RegPHR constrained the realization of its vision 
because it did not meet patient needs. From the outset, RegPHR was conceived as a generic por-
tal to access the health data of citizens. Such a conception can be explained by the circumstances 
of the genesis of RegPHR (i.e., to act as a viewer of SEHR), which forced sponsors of RegPHR 
to start with information services for citizens that could be provided by SEHR. Yet the realiza-
tion of the vision of RegPHR required taking into account the heterogeneity of patients and 
their diseases, and health self-management practices that could take place outside the control 
of the DHSS. For instance, citizens could have health records with health providers that were 
not part of the public healthcare system, and these health providers would have to be willing 
to integrate all their health data in a single place. However, since RegPHR neither had its own 
database nor could store data at SEHR, patients had no means to upload and store their health 
data on RegPHR. RegPHR provided little support for their healthcare practices.
Managers started depicting RegPHR in public presentations in 2010 as a tool for self-care 
management and prevention by emphasizing the idea that RegPHR was evolving towards a 
customizable model. Patients were supposed to be able to personalize in the near future the 
type of services in RegPHR according to their profile and healthcare needs. However, with the 
exception of a few new services (such as access through iPhone and access to medication plans) 
the type of information services that citizens could use remained the same. One of the members 
of the core of the team managing the RegPHR and SEHR projects noted: “we realized that 
RegPHR could not simply be a viewer; rather it should feed information back and forth to pa-
tients, and hence citizens should be able to interact with RegPHR. But in March 2010 we were 
not ready to add this type of functionality. We could only offer a viewer for SEHR”. This quote 
shows that the mismatch between the vision and the architecture was not so much a design flaw 
but the result of aspects related with organization, governance structure, and project budgeting. 
For instance, in terms of project organization most of the members involved in RegPHR were 
also involved in SEHR. The person in charge of the functional aspects of RegPHR had 10% of 
her time assigned to RegPHR and 90% to the SEHR project. Moreover, the RegPHR project 
did not have a specific budget. It depended on the budget of SEHR. As the former coordinator 
of health IT at the DHSS and sponsor of RegPHR noted: “all the money has gone to SEHR; 
moreover, the total amount of money decreased, and this means that we could not transfer 
money to the development and extension of RegPHR”. Likewise, the initial rollout strategy of 
RegPHR mirrored SEHR in the sense that it was driven by health providers and not by patient 
needs. The information services provided by RegPHR were based on the information obtained 
from health providers rather than the needs of patients.
Given these architectural and non-architectural constraints, the DHSS tried to address what 
they considered were the needs of patients by opening RegPHR. The DHSS expected that the 
opening of RegPHR would spur the production of new services (by third-party application pro-
viders) that met patient needs, and hence would feed a positive feedback loop between patients 
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and third-party applications (fifth loop in Figure 4). To manage and govern that transformation 
from a two-sided to a three-sided network, RegPHR management set up an interoperability 
framework. The interoperability framework entailed a radical change in the strategy and role of 
the DHSS—and RegPHR became a gateway to other IIs (not only SEHR). Under the interop-
erability framework, the ownership and control of RegPHR started to separate. The DHSS gave 
up the ownership of new services that RegPHR offered but not the control. The DHSS kept 
control over RegPHR in terms of what can be offered, and more importantly, to whom it can 
be offered. For instance, third-party providers that obtain recognition from the DHSS cannot 
target new patients directly through RegPHR. Rather, they can publish their applications in 
RegPHR, and when a patient selects a third-party application for the first time, RegPHR checks 
online whether the patient has the right to use that service. However, when this study was con-
ducted it remained to be seen whether events would unfold as expected.
Architectural themes Feedback loops negatively affected by the architecture
Theme 1: Poor data 
quality
In response to poor quality data published in SEHR, doctors (first feedback 
loop) and patients (second feedback loop) gave up using SEHR and 
RegPHR. As fewer patients used RegPHR, managers of RegPHR had less 
capacity to raise resources to innovate new services for patients (fourth 
feedback loop). 
Theme 2: Coordina-
tion across hetero-
geneity
Since SEHR did not fully support the coordination of the provision of care 
services between health providers, doctors did not perceive much value in 
using SEHR (first feedback loop). This behavior was detrimental for the 
quality of health data uploaded to SEHR and hence to the value of using 
RegPHR for patients (second feedback loop), and the capacity of RegPHR 
management to innovate new services for patients (fourth feedback loop). 
Theme 3: Privacy 
and control
The registration and authentication processes and mechanisms discouraged 
citizens from accessing RegPHR (second and third feedback loops), and in 
turn, diminished the capacity of RegPHR management to raise additional 
resources to innovate new services for patients (fourth feedback loop).
Theme 4: Re-config-
urability
The fact that RegPHR was initially conceived as a viewer of SEHR, which 
patients could not personalize to their needs, discouraged the latter from 
using it (second and third feedback loops), and this in turn, hindered the 
capacity of RegPHR management to innovate new services for patients 
(fourth feedback loop). Likewise, since patients could not personalize 
RegPHR, third-party healthcare application providers had little incentive 
for interconnecting (and offering) their services to RegPHR (fifth feedback 
loop).
Table 3. Architectural constraints on the feedback loops
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5.3 Architectural constraints and design principles
The section analyses the four architectural constraints on the generation of positive feedback 
loops presented in the previous section against the four design principles for II bootstrapping 
proposed by Hanseth and Lyytinen (2010) and Aanestad and Jensen (2011).
The principle ‘design initially for direct usefulness’ relates to the identification and targeting 
of a small group with an IT capability that is useful, simple to use, and easy to implement. 
RegPHR (as shown in the re-configurability theme) was conceived as a generic solution for the 
health needs of all the citizens in the region. Such a conception can be explained by the un-
derlying vision of the genesis of RegPHR (i.e., as a viewer of SEHR), which forced sponsors of 
RegPHR to start with some basic information services provided by SEHR for all potential users. 
The sponsors of RegPHR later narrowed the base of users and started thinking about specific 
groups (e.g., blood donors and diabetics). Yet this new approach to the user base was still lim-
ited because RegPHR and SEHR were highly interdependent in terms of architecture, project 
organization, and budget. Secondly, the theme privacy and control shows that despite RegPHR 
developed new services (e.g., medication plan) and access channels (e.g., mobile phones), the 
processes of registration and authentication were cumbersome and unfamiliar. The sponsors 
of RegPHR were aware of this fact and justified these processes as legal requirements. Howev-
er, even after some regulatory changes that simplified these processes, there were discrepancies 
among the RegPHR management team about the level of security that was needed. Finally, 
as shown in the ‘poor data quality’ theme, the services offered until the end of this study by 
RegPHR were of the one-to-many type (e.g., reports, diagnostics, vaccines, and medication 
plans). This approach followed the suggestion of designing one-to-many capabilities in contrast 
to all-to-all capabilities (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010). This approach is supposed to be effective 
as one-to-many services do not need to reach a critical mass to become quickly adopted; that is, 
the fact that a patient uses any of these services does not directly generate more value for other 
patients. However, when we look at the tight coupling between SEHR and RegPHR we can 
regard the services offered by RegPHR not as one-to-many type but as of a many-to-many type. 
The value of RegPHR depended on doctors using SEHR. Hence, since not all health providers 
uploaded all their patient health data (or did so with a delay), doctors saw little value in using 
SEHR, and that ultimately diminished the usefulness of RegPHR for patients.
The design principle ‘build upon the installed base’, advises building connections with the 
installed base during the design time by for instance, building gateways to existing infrastruc-
ture. The theme ‘coordination across heterogeneity’ shows that the SEHR design ignored the 
installed base of systems and mechanisms that health providers had in-place to coordinate their 
cross-organizational activity. SEHR architecture displaced this installed base. On the other 
hand, as shown in theme ‘re-configurability’ RegPHR could be seen as a gateway to SEHR. Yet 
as RegPHR was not a gateway to other systems used by patients, it did not meet the patients’ 
individual needs. The opening strategy adopted in 2012 for RegPHR tried to link RegPHR with 
other installed bases of patients. Yet it remains to be seen whether this strategy will bring results.
The design principle of ‘expand the installed base by using persuasive tactics to gain momentum’ 
suggests that the user base should grow before adding new functionality. RegPHR management 
partially followed this design principle by targeting some communities (e.g., blood donors and 
diabetics) but the governance model did not foster enough feedback and learning. For instance, 
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the initial strategy for the roll-out involved relevant actors in the territory (e.g., city council and 
health providers) and was expected to persuade patients (citizens) to use RegPHR. However, this 
rollout strategy was unsatisfactory and very slow given the number of health providers in all the 
health districts. For this reason, RegPHR management abandoned this strategy and opted for 
extending RegPHR to all regional citizens (about seven million).
Finally, the design principle ‘modularize the II’ assumes that complex capabilities limit the 
capacity of IIs to grow adaptively and re-organize constantly. Accordingly, this principle aims to 
allow independent incremental change by modularizing – i.e., decomposing the functionalities 
into loosely coupled components and defining interface specifications for how others should 
interact with those components. Despite the fact that the architecture of RegPHR and SEHR 
were both modular, RegPHR did not bootstrap. We provide an explanation for that outcome by 
considering the upward and downward flexibility of the PHR (Tilson et al. 2010). In our case, 
RegPHR possessed upward flexibility as it was open to the provision of new services by third 
parties (by means of the interoperability framework and set of web services). On the other hand, 
although SEHR provided a set of web services for RegPHR, SEHR was the only data provider 
for RegPHR. Hence, we can say that RegPHR did not possess downward flexibility. In short, 
even though RegPHR architecture was modular, the fact that it did not possess much down-
stream flexibility eroded the possible benefits of modularity.
6 Implications and conclusions
In this paper we empirically investigated from an architectural perspective the genesis, design, 
implementation, and evolution of an integrated PHR (Tang et al. 2006) that had not boot-
strapped after four years (2009-2013). Our results contribute to the literature on PHR in several 
ways. Firstly, to our knowledge, this paper is the first to study the failure of a PHR to bootstrap 
by focusing on how the PHR architecture hindered the generation of positive feedback loops.
Secondly, existing PHR studies have identified lists of factors (e.g., flawed design and concep-
tualization of the PHR, excessive integration between the PHR and the EHR, access to infor-
mation, lack of security, and privacy standards) that enable and inhibit PHR adoption from the 
perspective of healthcare professionals (Nazi 2013), patients (Lafkin and Horan 2011; Noblin 
et al. 2012), or both (Archer et al. 2011; Greenhalgh et al. 2010). Our four architectural themes 
concur with some of the factors captured in the literature. For instance, in line with the results 
of Greenhalgh et al. (2010), we show that the PHR architecture did not align well with the pa-
tient healthcare management needs (’re-configurability’ theme), and with the access mechanisms 
(’privacy and control’ theme). However, in line with the II perspective, our narrative removes 
the actors from the centre stage and focuses instead on wider dynamics that extend beyond 
what is observable from the point of view of a single actor. Our results refer to features of the 
PHR architecture that inhibited the uptake of the PHR by hindering the generation of positive 
feedback loops. By tracking the changes on the architecture our results account for the diverse 
interests and viewpoints of actors that are part of the PHR: health provider organisations, doc-
tors, nurses, patients, and health authority.
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Thirdly, existing literature has advocated integration between EHR and PHR. In particular, 
after reviewing the literature on PHRs, Archer et al. (2011) find that “because primary care 
doctors play a key role in patient health, PHRs are likely to be linked to physician electronic 
medical record systems, so PHR adoption is dependent on growth in electronic medical record 
adoption,” (p. 515). Our empirical results are in line with this finding. Since RegPHR was a 
viewer for SEHR, the quality of the data in RegPHR depended on the quality of the data in 
SEHR. We also show how certain architectural features of the EHR (e.g., push architecture, not 
mirroring the structure of the field) conditioned the behaviour of some of the health providers as 
the quality of the health data (in terms of completeness and timeliness) that they published was 
not adequate. That resulted in a garbage-in, garbage-out effect that negatively impacted on the 
quality of the interactions between patients and doctors (Epstein et al. 2010) thus diminishing 
the value of the EHR and the PHR for other doctors and patients.
Wang et al. (2012) go further to suggest that: “For EHRs and PHRs to become effective 
tools for clinicians and patients, they must merge into an all-in-one record, in which each par-
ty has control over updating a separate part” (p. 570). In our study, although the SEHR and 
RegPHR had a unique database (thus following the recommendation of all-in-one record), only 
health professionals had control over that information. Patients could not upload health data 
from other health sources, nor personalize the kind of services they could use from RegPHR. 
This also connects with our fourth architectural theme of re-configurability. Specifically, we 
have shown that the differences between the vision of the EHR and the PHR (the first oriented 
towards coordination, and the second oriented towards enhancing patient responsibility and 
control to foster patient self-management) have important consequences for the architectur-
al approach. Both visions require different functionalities, services, and architectural features, 
which cannot be easily reconciled when the PHR is conceived as a viewer of the shared EHR. 
Such a conception limits the capacity of the PHR to cater to heterogeneous and evolving patient 
health needs. We argue that preserving the transformative capacity of PHRs (Grisot and Vassi-
lakopoulou 2013) requires keeping some degree of autonomy of PHRs versus shared EHRs.
From our assessment of the four architectural themes against the four principles for II de-
sign proposed by Hanseth and Lyytinen (2010) and Aanestad and Jensen (2011), we draw two 
lessons. Firstly, our analysis shows that those design principles were partially followed; some 
decisions and interventions from the designers complied with those principles – while others 
deviated from them. However, the degree of compliance with those design principles varied over 
time. This leads us to argue that the application of the design principles must consider not only 
the context as Jensen (2013) suggests, but also the dynamic nature of designers’ decisions and 
interventions that may often change during evolution of the II. Secondly, while Aanestad and 
Jensen (2011) provided empirical evidence for the relation between the modularity of IIs and 
their bootstrapping, our empirical results complement that evidence by suggesting that in the 
assessment of the modularity of IIs, one must also consider the upstream and downstream flex-
ibility of II architecture. The idea of upstream and downstream flexibility highlights the degree 
of coupling of IIs and the associated tensions that might be generated (Tilson et al. 2010). As 
we saw in our case, although the architecture of RegPHR and SEHR was modular, RegPHR did 
not possess much downstream flexibility because it was highly dependent on data from SEHR. 
Such a lack of downstream flexibility ultimately hindered the generation of feedback loops. 
Based on our empirical results, we conjecture that in the context of integrated PHRs, the lack of 
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downstream flexibility is likely to erode the possible benefits of modularity claimed by Aanestad 
and Jensen (2011).
Similarly, our study connects and extends previous work on II architecture by Hanseth and 
Bygstad (2014). Through a study of ten healthcare IIs in Norway over the last 20 years, Hanseth 
and Bygstad (2014) characterize two types of architectural approaches based on the degree of 
coupling between the applications and the communication modules, and the communication 
modules themselves. The authors describe the first type of architecture as INA (application cen-
tric/institutional interface) and state that the corresponding IIs are unsuccessful; the second type 
of architecture is described as SPA (system centric/service provider) and the corresponding IIs 
are more successful. We consider that despite the architecture of RegPHR resembles more SPA 
architecture than INA architecture our results have shown that RegPHR had limited success (it 
did not bootstrap) during the period 2009-2013. We consider our results complement these 
two architectural approaches by highlighting two other architectural features that inhibited the 
bootstrapping of RegPHR: 1) the location and control of data which created overdependence 
between the architecture of the PHR and the architecture of the shared EHR; and 2) the lack of 
separation between ownership and control of new services that limited the capacity of the PHR 
to adapt to the user community. The PHR was not independent enough from the shared EHR 
to deliver immediate value to users, and this lack of independence hindered the generation of 
positive feedback loops.
Our research has some limitations that must be acknowledged. Firstly, our architectural 
approach has allowed us to bring the voice of a great variety of actors (doctors, nurses, managers 
of health providers, third-party developers, users, designers, and managers of the PHR at the re-
gional health service) into this research. Yet given our goal of studying the relationship between 
the lack of bootstrapping and the architecture, the strongest voice has been that of the core team 
in charge of the design, implementation, and operation of the PHR and EHR. In that sense, 
there are other non-architectural factors (e.g., interests and incentives of health professionals 
and patients) that may also explain the lack of bootstrapping. Another limitation of our study 
concerns the context in which it was conducted, which may limit the generalization of the 
findings to other settings with a different public healthcare system (e.g., having less variety of 
health providers).
We consider this article provides a step forward towards a better understanding of the re-
lationship between architecture and the generation of positive feedback loops that drive PHR 
bootstrapping. At the practical level, we believe that the four architectural constraints on the 
generation of positive feedback loops, as well as the architectural alternatives presented in the pa-
per, are relevant as they can help designers and policymakers devise more effective interventions 
during the implementation of large-scale systems in healthcare.
Notes
1. SEHR interconnected the diverse electronic medical records of health providers.
2. The DHSS gives each citizen in the region an individual medical card that contains data 
fields for a personal identification code (which corresponds to the code of the insured citi-
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zen), name and surname, social security number, type of coverage, and expiration data. All 
of these data fields are coded in a magnetic stripe.
3. The regional certification agency is a governmental agency set up in 2002 to implement 
and rollout the digital signature in all regional governmental institutions and provide ser-
vices to those organisations by ensuring that electronic transactions are safe.
4. The providers of test strips – usually pharmaceutical companies such as Sanofi or Roche – 
also provide other devices for the treatment and control of the disease (e.g., glucometers, 
insulin pens, and a self-monitor software application for patients).
5. The RHS makes multi-annual contracts with health providers that are revised annually. 
Several contractual clauses required health providers to use SEHR.
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